| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27595 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27595 |
| Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements | |
| Marina Azzimonti; Gabriel P. Mihalache; Laura Karpuska | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the welfare implications of introducing budget rules, composed by a tax code and an entitlement program, in a dynamic infinite horizon political-economy model featuring disagreement over the distribution of resources. Poor agents want expansive entitlement programs, whereas rich agents prefer a small government that imposes low taxes. Under budget rules, changes in the tax code and the generosity of entitlement programs require bipartisan support. We model these rules following the literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status quo, and find that entitlement programs induce under-provision of public goods but also a smoother path for private consumption. Whether budget rules are welfare-improving depends critically on political turnover. When proposers alternate frequently, such rules benefit society because they reduce the volatility of private consumption. Outcomes under rules, however, can be worse than under discretion if the political power of a proposer is persistent enough. Even though the political equilibrium may be more efficient in such case, it can also be significantly less equitable, exacerbating the initial degree of income inequality. We also consider an institutional reform, where parties are allowed to vote on both, the introduction and generosity of the entitlement program and the tax code. Because such a reform must be Pareto improving (by design), policymakers may prefer to stay under discretion. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27595 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585266 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Azzimonti,Gabriel P. Mihalache,Laura Karpuska. Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27595.pdf（964KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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