| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27607 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27607 |
| Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools | |
| Jesse M. Bruhn; Scott A. Imberman; Marcus A. Winters | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27607 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585279 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jesse M. Bruhn,Scott A. Imberman,Marcus A. Winters. Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27607.pdf（739KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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