| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27610 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27610 |
| A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards | |
| Michael J. Fishman; Jonathan A. Parker; Ludwig Straub | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a tractable dynamic model of credit markets in which lending standards and the quality of potential borrowers are endogenous. Competitive banks privately choose their lending standards: whether to pay a cost to screen out some unprofitable borrowers. Lending standards have negative externalities and are dynamic strategic complements: tighter screening worsens the future pool of borrowers for all banks and increases their incentives to screen in the future. Lending standards can amplify and prolong temporary downturns, affecting lending volume, credit spreads, and default rates. We characterize constrained-optimal policy which can generally be implemented as a government loan insurance program. When markets recover, they may do so only slowly, a phenomenon we call “slow thawing.” Finally, we show that limits on lending such as from capital constraints naturally incentivize tight lending standards, further amplifying shocks to credit markets. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27610 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585282 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael J. Fishman,Jonathan A. Parker,Ludwig Straub. A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27610.pdf（457KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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