| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27631 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27631 |
| Persuasion on Networks | |
| Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze persuasion in a model in which each receiver can buy a direct access to the sender's signal or rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher bias increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or one, but not in-between. The impact of network density depends on this probability as well. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27631 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585303 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georgy Egorov,Konstantin Sonin. Persuasion on Networks. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27631.pdf（504KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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