| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27671 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27671 |
| A Quantitative Theory of the Credit Score | |
| Satyajit Chatterjee; Dean Corbae; Kyle P. Dempsey; José-Víctor Ríos-Rull | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-17 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the role of credit scores in credit markets? We argue that it is a stand in for a market assessment of a person’s unobservable type (which here we take to be patience). We pose a model of persistent hidden types where observable actions shape the public assessment of a person’s type via Bayesian updating. We show how dynamic reputation can incentivize repayment without monetary costs of default beyond the administrative cost of filing for bankruptcy. Importantly we show how an economy with credit scores implements the same equilibrium allocation. We estimate the model using both credit market data and the evolution of individual’s credit scores. We find a 3% difference in patience in almost equally sized groups in the population with significant turnover and a shift towards becoming more patient with age. If tracking of individual credit actions is outlawed, the benefits of bankruptcy forgiveness are outweighed by the higher interest rates associated with lower incentives to repay. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27671 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585343 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Satyajit Chatterjee,Dean Corbae,Kyle P. Dempsey,et al. A Quantitative Theory of the Credit Score. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27671.pdf（2076KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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