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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w27701 |
来源ID | Working Paper 27701 |
Bank Syndicates and Liquidity Provision | |
Joao A. C. Santos; S. Vish Viswanathan | |
发表日期 | 2020-08-17 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We provide evidence that credit lines offer liquidity insurance to borrowers. Borrowers are able to extensively use their credit lines in recessions and ahead of credit line cuts. In fact drawdowns and changes in drawdowns predict internal credit rating downgrades and credit line cuts, suggesting substantial liquidity access before credit line cuts. Credit line cuts are concentrated on borrowers who do not use credit lines, and when they occur they still leave borrowers with funds to draw down. Building on this evidence, we develop a model where syndicates faced with liquidity shocks continue to support credit line commitments due to the continuation value of their relationship with borrowers. Our model yields a set of predictions that find support in the data, including the substantial increase in the lead bank's retained loan share and in the commitment fees on the credit lines issued during the financial crisis of 2008-09. Consistent with the model, credit lines with higher expected drawdown rates pay higher commitment fees, and lead banks often increase their credit line investments in response to the failure of syndicate members, reducing borrowers' risk exposure to bank failures. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27701 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585373 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joao A. C. Santos,S. Vish Viswanathan. Bank Syndicates and Liquidity Provision. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w27701.pdf(1618KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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