| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27710 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27710 |
| Exit vs. Voice | |
| Eleonora Broccardo; Oliver D. Hart; Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-24 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in promoting socially desirable outcomes in companies. We show that in a competitive world exit is less effective than voice in pushing firms to act in a socially responsible manner. Furthermore, we demonstrate that individual incentives to join an exit strategy are not necessarily aligned with social incentives, whereas they are when well-diversified investors are allowed to express their voice. We discuss what social and legal considerations might sometimes make exit preferable to voice. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27710 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585382 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eleonora Broccardo,Oliver D. Hart,Luigi Zingales. Exit vs. Voice. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27710.pdf（504KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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