全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Repurchase Options in the Market for Lemons

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w27732
来源ID	Working Paper 27732
	Repurchase Options in the Market for Lemons
	Saki Bigio; Liyan Shi
发表日期	2020-08-24
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We study repurchase options (repo contracts) in a competitive asset market with asymmetric information. Gains from trade emerge from a liquidity need, but private information about asset quality prevents the full realization of trade. We obtain a unique equilibrium, which features a pooling repo contract and full participation among borrowers. The equilibrium repo contract resolves adverse selection: the embedded repurchase option prevents the market unraveling that occurs in asset-sale markets. However, the contract is inefficient due to cream skimming. Competition to attract high-quality borrowers through the terms of the repurchase option inefficiently lowers liquidity. The equilibrium contract has a closed form and is portable to many applications.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w27732
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585404
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Saki Bigio,Liyan Shi. Repurchase Options in the Market for Lemons. 2020.