| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27742 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27742 |
| Social Distancing, Vaccination and the Paradoxical Optimality of an Endemic Equilibrium | |
| Andrew B. Abel; Stavros Panageas | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the impact of public health policy on the spread of a disease using a version of the SIR model that includes vital statistics, waning immunity, and vaccination. This model is rich enough to accommodate endemic steady states and disease-free steady states. We choose social distancing and vaccines to maximize an objective function that penalizes lost output resulting from social distancing, deaths resulting from the disease, and the cost of vaccination. Surprisingly, even though a disease-free equilibrium is attainable, optimal policy leads to an endemic steady state, though with a small number of deaths and negligible loss of output. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; COVID-19 |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27742 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585414 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew B. Abel,Stavros Panageas. Social Distancing, Vaccination and the Paradoxical Optimality of an Endemic Equilibrium. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27742.pdf（32751KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
