| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27743 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27743 |
| Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? | |
| Alessandra Casella; Antonin Macé | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling – the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions – to trade votes with oneself only – such as storable votes or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27743 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585415 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Antonin Macé. Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27743.pdf（451KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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