| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27765 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27765 |
| Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money | |
| Mohammad Akbarpour; Julien Combe; Yinghua He; Victor Hiller; Robert Shimer; Olivier Tercieux | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-07 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses “memory” as a medium of exchange to eliminate these timing constraints. In a dynamic matching model, we prove that Unpaired delivers a waiting time of patients close to optimal and substantially shorter than currently utilized state-of-the-art algorithms. Using a rich administrative dataset from France, we show that Unpaired achieves a match rate of 57 percent and an average waiting time of 440 days. The (infeasible) optimal algorithm is only slightly better (58 percent and 425 days); state-of-the-art algorithms deliver less than 34 percent and more than 695 days. We draw similar conclusions from the simulations of two large U.S. platforms. Lastly, we propose a range of solutions that can address the potential practical concerns of Unpaired. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27765 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585437 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mohammad Akbarpour,Julien Combe,Yinghua He,et al. Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27765.pdf（967KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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