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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w27769
来源IDWorking Paper 27769
Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle
Michael Ewens; Nadya Malenko
发表日期2020-09-14
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We explore the dynamics of venture capital (VC)-backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing, when control becomes shared, and hold a tie-breaking vote. Their presence is particularly likely when the potential for VC-entrepreneur conflicts is higher. At later stages, control switches to VCs and independent director characteristics change. These patterns are consistent with independent directors playing both a mediating and advising role over the startup life cycle, and thus representing another potential source of value-add to startup performance.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w27769
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585470
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GB/T 7714
Michael Ewens,Nadya Malenko. Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle. 2020.
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