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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w27769 |
来源ID | Working Paper 27769 |
Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle | |
Michael Ewens; Nadya Malenko | |
发表日期 | 2020-09-14 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We explore the dynamics of venture capital (VC)-backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing, when control becomes shared, and hold a tie-breaking vote. Their presence is particularly likely when the potential for VC-entrepreneur conflicts is higher. At later stages, control switches to VCs and independent director characteristics change. These patterns are consistent with independent directors playing both a mediating and advising role over the startup life cycle, and thus representing another potential source of value-add to startup performance. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27769 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585470 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ewens,Nadya Malenko. Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle. 2020. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w27769.pdf(826KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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