| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27842 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27842 |
| Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design | |
| Nathaniel Hendren; Camille Landais; Johannes Spinnewijn | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Should choice be offered in social insurance programs? The paper presents a conceptual framework that identifies the key forces determining the value of offering choice, reviews some existing evidence on these forces, and aims to guide further empirical research in different in- surance domains. The value of offering choice is higher the larger the variation in individual valuations, but gets reduced by both selection on risk and selection on moral hazard. The imple- mentation of choice-based policies is further challenged by the presence of adverse selection and choice frictions or the obligation to offer basic uncompensated care. These inefficiencies can be seen as externalities, which do not rationalize the absence of providing choice per se, but point to the need for regulatory policies and the potential value of corrective pricing à la Pigou. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27842 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585513 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nathaniel Hendren,Camille Landais,Johannes Spinnewijn. Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27842.pdf（354KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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