| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27875 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27875 |
| Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program | |
| C. Yiwei Zhang; Jeffrey Hemmeter; Judd B. Kessler; Robert D. Metcalfe; Robert Weathers | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-09-28 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27875 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585548 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | C. Yiwei Zhang,Jeffrey Hemmeter,Judd B. Kessler,et al. Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27875.pdf（497KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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