| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27880 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27880 |
| Incentivizing Negative Emissions Through Carbon Shares | |
| Derek Lemoine | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I analyze a novel climate policy instrument that attaches a transferable asset to each unit of carbon in the atmosphere. I show that this instrument improves on an emission tax by incentivizing both optimal emission reductions and optimal removal of past emissions. Emitters post a bond equal to the worst-case social cost of carbon, and the regulator deducts damages as they are realized over time. Quantitatively, a bond that is double the optimal emission tax is sufficient to provide optimal carbon removal incentives in 95% of cases. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27880 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585553 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Derek Lemoine. Incentivizing Negative Emissions Through Carbon Shares. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27880.pdf（517KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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