| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27948 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27948 |
| Moneyball in Medicare: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects | |
| Edward C. Norton; Emily J. Lawton; Jun Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | One of the most important changes to the United States health care system over the last two decades is the emergence of pay-for-performance as a way to encourage hospitals and other providers to improve quality of care. Unlike fee-for-service, these value-based purchasing programs measure aspects of quality and financially reward hospitals that are outstanding or at least improving in their care. Prior research has shown that hospitals often improve more when the marginal financial incentives are larger. However, the exact relationship between marginal financial incentives and year-over-year improvement in measures remains unclear. In this study, we use national 20152018 data on approximately 2,700 hospitals to estimate how hospitals respond to pay-for-performance incentives in the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) Program. We show that this relationship is non-linear, has strong serial correlation, is somewhat similar for safety-net hospitals as non-safety-net hospitals, and is proportional to the size of the Medicare patient population. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27948 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585622 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward C. Norton,Emily J. Lawton,Jun Li. Moneyball in Medicare: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27948.pdf（337KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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