| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27949 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27949 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy | |
| Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economics of non-democracies. Dictators face many challenges to their rule: internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, or external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators — hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, running a propaganda campaign, organizing electoral fraud, purging associates and opponents, and repressing citizens — as driven by the desire to maximize the regime's chances of staying in power. We argue that the key to understanding the functioning and ultimately the fate of a nondemocratic regime is the information flows within the regime, and the institutions that govern these information flows. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27949 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585623 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georgy Egorov,Konstantin Sonin. The Political Economics of Non-democracy. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27949.pdf（572KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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