| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27981 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27981 |
| Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining | |
| Renee Bowen; Ilwoo Hwang; Stefan Krasa | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-26 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bargaining between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter’s proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her “personal power”. Players learn about the setter’s power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter’s perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise when the setter has moderate personal power. The presence of “difficult” issues can induce more compromise as the players have incentives to avoid testing the setter’s power. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27981 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585654 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Renee Bowen,Ilwoo Hwang,Stefan Krasa. Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27981.pdf（351KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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