| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27984 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27984 |
| Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis | |
| Matthew Backus; Thomas Blake; Jett Pettus; Steven Tadelis | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-10-26 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Bargaining breakdown—whether as delay, conflict, or missing trade—plagues bargaining in environments with incomplete information. Can a bargaining environment that facilitates or restricts communication alleviate these costs? We exploit a unique opportunity to study this question using real market transactions: eBay Germany’s Best Offer platform. On May 23, 2016, the platform introduced unstructured communication allowing buyers and sellers on the desktop version of the site, but not the mobile app, to accompany price offers with a message. Using this natural experiment, our difference-in-differences approach documents a 14% decrease in the the rate of breakdown among compliers. Though adoption is immediate, the effect is not. We show, using text analysis, that the dynamics are consistent with repeat players learning how to use communication in bargaining, and that the messaging strategies of experienced sellers are correlated with successful bargaining. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27984 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585657 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Backus,Thomas Blake,Jett Pettus,et al. Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27984.pdf（1018KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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