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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w28002 |
来源ID | Working Paper 28002 |
r Minus g | |
Robert J. Barro | |
发表日期 | 2020-10-26 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Long-term data show that the dynamic efficiency condition `r>g` holds when `g` is represented by the average growth rate of real GDP if `r` is the average real rate of return on equity, `E(r^e)`, but not if `r` is the risk-free rate, `r^f`. This pattern accords with a simple disaster-risk model calibrated to fit observed equity premia. If Ponzi (chain-letter) finance by private agents and the government are precluded, the equilibrium can feature `r^f≤E(g)`, a result that does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, `E(r^e)>E(g)` is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with the data. The model satisfies Ricardian Equivalence because, without Ponzi finance by the government, a rise in safe assets from increased public debt is matched by an increase in the safe (that is, certain) present value of liabilities associated with net taxes. |
主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28002 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585675 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert J. Barro. r Minus g. 2020. |
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w28002.pdf(444KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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