| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28016 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28016 |
| Adverse Selection Dynamics in Privately-Produced Safe Debt Markets | |
| Nathan Foley-Fisher; Gary B. Gorton; Stéphane Verani | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Privately-produced safe debt is designed so that there is no adverse selection in trade. This is because no agent finds it profitable to produce private information about the debt’s backing and all agents know this (i.e., it is information-insensitive). But in some macro states, it becomes profitable for some agents to produce private information, and then the debt faces adverse selection when traded (i.e., it becomes information-sensitive). We empirically study these adverse selection dynamics in a very important asset class, collateralized loan obligations, a large symbiotic appendage of the regulated banking system, which finances loans to below investment-grade firms. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28016 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585689 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nathan Foley-Fisher,Gary B. Gorton,Stéphane Verani. Adverse Selection Dynamics in Privately-Produced Safe Debt Markets. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28016.pdf（835KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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