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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w28016
来源IDWorking Paper 28016
Adverse Selection Dynamics in Privately-Produced Safe Debt Markets
Nathan Foley-Fisher; Gary B. Gorton; Stéphane Verani
发表日期2020-11-02
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Privately-produced safe debt is designed so that there is no adverse selection in trade. This is because no agent finds it profitable to produce private information about the debt’s backing and all agents know this (i.e., it is information-insensitive). But in some macro states, it becomes profitable for some agents to produce private information, and then the debt faces adverse selection when traded (i.e., it becomes information-sensitive). We empirically study these adverse selection dynamics in a very important asset class, collateralized loan obligations, a large symbiotic appendage of the regulated banking system, which finances loans to below investment-grade firms.
主题Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28016
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585689
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Nathan Foley-Fisher,Gary B. Gorton,Stéphane Verani. Adverse Selection Dynamics in Privately-Produced Safe Debt Markets. 2020.
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