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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w28021
来源IDWorking Paper 28021
Fintech Borrowers: Lax-Screening or Cream-Skimming?
Marco Di Maggio; Vincent Yao
发表日期2020-11-02
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We study the personal credit market using unique individual-level data covering fintech and traditional lenders. We show that fintech lenders acquire market share by first lending to higher-risk borrowers and then to safer borrowers, and mainly rely on hard information to make credit decisions. Fintech borrowers are significantly more likely to default than neighbor individuals with the same characteristics borrowing from traditional financial institutions. Furthermore, they tend to experience only a short- lived reduction in the cost of credit, because their indebtedness increases more than non-fintech borrowers a few months after loan origination. However, fintech lenders' pricing strategies are likely to take this into account.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Behavioral Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28021
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585694
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GB/T 7714
Marco Di Maggio,Vincent Yao. Fintech Borrowers: Lax-Screening or Cream-Skimming?. 2020.
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