| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28042 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28042 |
| Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence | |
| Sylvain Chassang; Lucia Del Carpio; Samuel Kapon | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a government collecting taxes from a large number of tax-payers using limited enforcement capacity. Under random enforcement, limited capacity results in multiple equilibria: if most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade individual misbehavior; if most agents do not comply, enforcement capacity is over-stretched and fails to dissuade misbehavior. In settings without behavioral frictions, prioritized enforcement strategies can implement high collection as the unique rationalizable outcome. We investigate both theoretically and experimentally the extent to which this insight extends to environments with incomplete information and bounded rationality. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28042 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585715 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvain Chassang,Lucia Del Carpio,Samuel Kapon. Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28042.pdf（1058KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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