| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28054 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28054 |
| Price Ceiling, Market Structure, and Payout Policies | |
| Mao Ye; Miles Zheng; Xiongshi Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | To prevent firms from manipulating prices, U.S. regulators set price ceilings for open-market share repurchases. We find that market structure reforms in the 1990s and 2000s dramatically increased share repurchases because they relaxed constraints that prevent firms from competing with other traders under price ceilings. The 2016 Tick Size Pilot, a controlled experiment that partially reversed previous reforms, significantly reduced share repurchases. Market structure frictions provide a unified explanation for two puzzles: the dividend puzzle exists because previous research has overlooked market structure frictions; share repurchases increase relative to dividends over time because market structure reforms gradually reduce these frictions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28054 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585727 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mao Ye,Miles Zheng,Xiongshi Li. Price Ceiling, Market Structure, and Payout Policies. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28054.pdf（448KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
