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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w28069
来源IDWorking Paper 28069
Corporate Governance, Business Group Governance and Economic Development Traps
Luis Dau; Randall Morck; Bernard Yeung
发表日期2020-11-09
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Every firm in a developed economy relies on the mere existence of countless other firms to keep prices competitive up and down all supply chains. Without this network externality, no firm forms; and without many firms, no network forms; locking in a low-income trap. Business group governance supersedes corporate governance in most developing economies and in the rapid catch-up development phases of most high-income economies by hierarchically coordinating firms in multiple industries, internalizing this network externality. High-income economies grow via creative destruction - creative firms imposing a negative externality upon firms they destroy or disrupt, but a larger positive innovation-related externality upon the whole economy. Business groups avoid creative self-destruction, innovation by one group firm that disrupts another. Corporate governance supersedes business group governance in high-income economies to facilitate productivity growth. If business group governance does not retreat, productivity growth is impaired and a middle-income trap can result.
主题Other ; History of Economic Thought ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; History ; Financial History ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Economic Systems
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28069
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585741
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GB/T 7714
Luis Dau,Randall Morck,Bernard Yeung. Corporate Governance, Business Group Governance and Economic Development Traps. 2020.
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