| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28084 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28084 |
| Wages, Hires, and Labor Market Concentration | |
| Ioana Marinescu; Ivan Ouss; Louis-Daniel Pape | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How does employer market power affect workers? We compute the concentration of new hires by occupation and commuting zone in France using linked employer-employee data. Using instrumental variables with worker and firm fixed effects, we find that a 10% increase in labor market concentration decreases hires by 12.4% and the wages of new hires by nearly 0.9%, as hypothesized by monopsony theory. Based on a simple merger simulation, we find that a merger between the top two employers in the retail industry would be most damaging, with about 24 million euros in annual lost wages for new hires, and an 8000 decrease in annual hires. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28084 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585758 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ioana Marinescu,Ivan Ouss,Louis-Daniel Pape. Wages, Hires, and Labor Market Concentration. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28084.pdf（5890KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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