| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28091 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28091 |
| Choice Screen Auctions | |
| Michael Ostrovsky | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google's Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google's own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these auctions—whether they are conducted on a “per appearance” or a “per install” basis—plays a major role in the mix and characteristics of auction winners, and, consequently, in their expected overall market share. I also show that “per install” auctions distort the incentives of alternative search engines toward extracting as much revenue as possible from each user who installs them, at the expense of lowering the expected number of such users. The distortion becomes worse as the auction gets more competitive and the number of bidders increases. Empirical evidence from Android choice screen auctions conducted in 2020 is consistent with my theoretical results. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28091 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ostrovsky. Choice Screen Auctions. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28091.pdf（354KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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