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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w28130 |
来源ID | Working Paper 28130 |
Policy Instrument Choice with Coasean Provision of Public Goods | |
Christopher Costello; Matthew Kotchen | |
发表日期 | 2020-11-23 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We examine the interplay between environmental policy instrument choice (i.e., prices vs. quantities) and private provision of public goods, which in this context we denote "Coasean provision." Coasean provision captures private provision of environmental public goods due to consumer preferences for environmentally friendly goods and services, incentives for corporate environmental management, environmental philanthropy, and even overlapping jurisdictions of policy. We show theoretically that even in a world of perfect certainty, the presence of Coasean provision distinctly affects instrument choice, based on both the efficiency criterion and distributional consequences. We also generalize the analysis to account for uncertainty using the classic Weitzman (1974) framework. Our findings suggest that the increasing prevalence of Coasean provision motivates a need to rethink the design of effective and efficient environmental policy instruments. This arises because policy instrument choice can have a significant impact on the environmental commitments of individuals, companies, and states, and vice-versa, with clear implications for overall economic welfare and policy preferences among polluters, citizens, and government revenue. |
主题 | Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28130 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585804 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Costello,Matthew Kotchen. Policy Instrument Choice with Coasean Provision of Public Goods. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w28130.pdf(633KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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