| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28187 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28187 |
| Modern US Workers\u2019 Compensation and Work-Related Injury: No Evidence of Moral Hazard | |
| Emiliano Huet-Vaughn; Youssef Benzarti | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-14 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We exploit recent decades of US state-level reforms to the generosity of workers’ compensation programs to estimate the associated moral hazard, utilizing an event- study design and analyzing 9 separate reform categories. The reforms vary - some affecting benefit size, some the probability of receiving benefits; some paid in cash, some in-kind; some constituting increases, some decreases, in generosity. Across the board, we find no evidence of resulting changes in workplace injuries, and, generally, can rule out even moderate moral hazard responses for severe and less severe injuries, suggesting a key moral hazard cost of workers’ compensation benefits is negligible. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28187 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585861 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emiliano Huet-Vaughn,Youssef Benzarti. Modern US Workers\u2019 Compensation and Work-Related Injury: No Evidence of Moral Hazard. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28187.pdf（469KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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