全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A Model of Occupational Licensing and Statistical Discrimination

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w28227
来源ID	Working Paper 28227
	A Model of Occupational Licensing and Statistical Discrimination
	Peter Q. Blair; Bobby W. Chung
发表日期	2020-12-21
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a model of statistical discrimination in occupational licensing. In the model, there is endogenous occupation selection and wage determination that depends on how costly it is to obtain the license and the productivity of the human capital that is bundled with the license. Under these assumptions, we find a unique equilibrium with sharp comparative statics for the licensing premiums. The key theoretical result in this paper is that the licensing premium is higher for workers who are members of demographic groups that face a higher cost of licensing. The intuition for this result is that the higher cost of licensing makes the license a more informative labor market signal. The predictions of the model can explain, for example, the empirical finding in the literature that occupational licenses that preclude felons close the racial wage gap among men by conferring a higher premium to black men than white men. Moreover, we show that in general the optimal cost of licensing is non-zero: an infinitely costly license screens out all workers while a cost less license is no screen at all.
主题	Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Discrimination ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w28227
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585901
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Peter Q. Blair,Bobby W. Chung. A Model of Occupational Licensing and Statistical Discrimination. 2020.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w28227.pdf（198KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览