| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28237 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28237 |
| Central Bank Digital Currency: When Price and Bank Stability Collide | |
| Linda Schilling; Jesús Fernández-Villaverde; Harald Uhlig | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central bank digital currency, or CBDC, may provide an attractive alternative to traditional demand deposits held in private banks. When offering CBDC accounts, the central bank needs to confront classic issues of banking: conducting maturity transformation while providing liquidity to private customers who suffer “spending” shocks. We analyze these issues in a nominal version of a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, with an additional and exogenous price stability objective for the central bank. While the central bank can always deliver on its nominal obligations, runs can nonetheless occur, manifesting themselves either as excessive real asset liquidation or as a failure to maintain price stability. We demonstrate an impossibility result that we call the CBDC trilemma: of the three goals of efficiency, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability, the central bank can achieve at most two. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28237 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585911 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Linda Schilling,Jesús Fernández-Villaverde,Harald Uhlig. Central Bank Digital Currency: When Price and Bank Stability Collide. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28237.pdf（618KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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