| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28299 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28299 |
| Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments | |
| Zach Y. Brown; Eduardo Montero; Carlos Schmidt-Padilla; Maria Micaela Sviatschi | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-04 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How do gangs compete for extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 non-aggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the non-aggression pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased extortion rates by 15% to 20%. Much of the increase in extortion rates was passed-through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organizations. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28299 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585972 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zach Y. Brown,Eduardo Montero,Carlos Schmidt-Padilla,et al. Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28299.pdf（982KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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