| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28272 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28272 |
| Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers | |
| Andrew Sweeting; Dun Jia; Shen Hui; Xinlu Yao | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We generalize recent models of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing for long-lived strategic buyers, with a single parameter capturing the extent to which each buyer internalizes future buyer surplus. Many of the equilibria that exist when buyers are atomistic or myopic are eliminated when buyers internalize even a modest share of their effects on future surplus. The equilibria that survive tend to be those where long-run market competition is preserved. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28272 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585987 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Sweeting,Dun Jia,Shen Hui,et al. Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28272.pdf（1466KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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