| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28330 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28330 |
| How do Physicians Respond to Malpractice Allegations? Evidence from Florida Emergency Departments | |
| Caitlin Carroll; David M. Cutler; Anupam Jena | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A substantial literature has studied the influence of malpractice pressure on physician behavior. However, these studies generally focus on malpractice pressure stemming from state laws that govern liability exposure, which may be unknown or not salient to physicians. We test how physicians respond to malpractice allegations made directly against them. Our sample is Emergency Department physicians in Florida, where we have the universe of data on patients and how they are treated along with a census of malpractice complaints. We find that physicians oversee 9% fewer discharges after malpractice allegations and treat each discharge 4% more expensively after an allegation. These effects are true for both allegations that result in money paid and allegations which are dropped. Further, the increase in treatment is generalized, i.e., not limited to patients with conditions similar to what the physician is reported for. The results suggest significant, if modest, impacts of malpractice claims on medical practice. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28330 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586003 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Caitlin Carroll,David M. Cutler,Anupam Jena. How do Physicians Respond to Malpractice Allegations? Evidence from Florida Emergency Departments. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28330.pdf（16348KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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