| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28359 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28359 |
| Populism, Protectionism, and Political Instability | |
| Tyler Daun; Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most populist regimes in Latin American countries used trade policy to redistribute income, despite being less efficient than other redistribution schemes such as transfers financed with an income tax. Often, this outcome is attributed to the lack of fiscal capacity in Latin American countries. Instead, we develop a simple political economy game where the populist government may use trade policy to encourage capitalists to invest in the more labor-intensive industry. Since moving capital is costly, those capitalists will support the continuation of the protectionist trade policy even after the populist government falls from power. The populist government may therefore choose to implement the less efficient but politically-sustainable policy instead of the more efficient policy that will be easily overturned after a regime change. Building fiscal capacity does not change the equilibrium. Only a long run commitment to a minimum level of redistribution restores efficiency. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28359 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tyler Daun,Sebastian Galiani,Gustavo Torrens. Populism, Protectionism, and Political Instability. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28359.pdf（459KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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