全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Contracting in Peer Networks

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w28378
来源ID	Working Paper 28378
	Contracting in Peer Networks
	Peter M. DeMarzo; Ron Kaniel
发表日期	2021-01-25
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	We consider multi-agent multi-firm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to a weighted average of their peers, where weights may vary within and across firms. Despite common shocks, compensation benchmarking can undo performance benchmarking, so that wages load positively rather than negatively on peer output. Although contracts appear inefficient, when a single principal commits to a public contract, the optimal contract hedges agents’ relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. Moreover, the principal can exploit any asymmetries in peer effects to enhance profits. With multiple principals, or a principal that is unable to commit, a “rat race” emerges in which agents are more productive, but wages increase even more, reducing profits and undermining efficiency. Effort levels are too high rather than too low, and can exceed first best. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Behavioral Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w28378
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586052
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Peter M. DeMarzo,Ron Kaniel. Contracting in Peer Networks. 2021.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w28378.pdf（1053KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览