| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28379 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28379 |
| The Organization of Innovation: Property Rights and the Outsourcing Decision | |
| Thomas Jungbauer; Sean Nicholson; June Pan; Michael Waldman | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product’s location in product space. An empirical analysis of our testable predictions using pharmaceutical data concerning patents, patent expiration, and outsourcing at various stages of the R&D process supports our theoretical findings. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28379 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586053 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Jungbauer,Sean Nicholson,June Pan,et al. The Organization of Innovation: Property Rights and the Outsourcing Decision. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28379.pdf（339KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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