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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w28409 |
来源ID | Working Paper 28409 |
Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders | |
Marta Lachowska; Alexandre Mas; Raffaele Saggio; Stephen A. Woodbury | |
发表日期 | 2021-02-01 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We employ a revealed-preference test to distinguish between wage posting and wage bargaining in the labor market. Using a sample of dual jobholders in Washington State, we estimate the sensitivity of wages and separation rates to wage shocks in a secondary job. In lower parts of the wage distribution, improvements in the outside option lead to higher separations rates but not to higher wages, consistent with wage posting. In the highest wage quartile, improved outside options translate to higher wages, but not higher separation rates, consistent with bargaining. In the aggregate, bargaining appears to be a limited determinant of wage setting. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28409 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586082 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marta Lachowska,Alexandre Mas,Raffaele Saggio,et al. Wage Posting or Wage Bargaining? A Test Using Dual Jobholders. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w28409.pdf(342KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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