| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28412 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28412 |
| Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises | |
| Sewon Hur; César Sosa-Padilla; Zeynep Yom | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal bailout policies in the presence of banking and sovereign crises. First, we use European data to document that asset guarantees are the most prevalent way in which sovereigns intervene during banking crises. Then, we build a model of sovereign borrowing with limited commitment, where domestic banks hold government debt and also provide credit to the private sector. Shocks to bank capital can trigger banking crises, with government sometimes finding it optimal to extend guarantees over bank assets. This leads to a trade-off: Larger bailouts relax domestic financial frictions and increase output, but also imply increasing government fiscal needs and possible heightened default risk (i.e., they create a ‘diabolic loop’). We find that the optimal bailouts exhibit clear properties. Other things equal, the fraction of banking losses that the bailouts would cover is: (i) decreasing in the level of government debt; (ii) increasing in aggregate productivity; and (iii) increasing in the severity of the bank- ing crisis. Even though bailouts mitigate the adverse effects of banking crises, we find that the economy is ex ante better off without bailouts: the ‘diabolic loop’ they create is too costly. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; International Economics ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28412 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586084 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sewon Hur,César Sosa-Padilla,Zeynep Yom. Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28412.pdf（584KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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