| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28413 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28413 |
| Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice | |
| Koichiro Ito; Takanori Ida; Makoto Tanaka | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals by unobserved heterogeneity in social welfare gains from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics to characterize social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered socially efficient dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28413 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586085 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Koichiro Ito,Takanori Ida,Makoto Tanaka. Selection on Welfare Gains: Experimental Evidence from Electricity Plan Choice. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28413.pdf（980KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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