| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28435 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28435 |
| The Unholy Trinity: Regulatory Forbearance, Stressed Banks and Zombie Firms | |
| Anusha Chari; Lakshita Jain; Nirupama Kulkarni | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | During the global financial crisis, the Reserve Bank of India enacted forbearance measures that lowered capital provisioning rates for loans under temporary liquidity stress. Matched bank-firm data reveal that troubled banks took advantage of the policy to also shield firms facing serious solvency issues. Perversely, in industries and bank portfolios with high proportions of failing firms, credit to healthy firms declined and was reallocated to the weakest firms. By incentivizing banks to hide true asset quality, the forbearance policy provided a license for regulatory arbitrage. The build-up of stressed assets in India’s predominantly state-owned banking system is consistent with accounting subterfuge. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28435 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586108 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anusha Chari,Lakshita Jain,Nirupama Kulkarni. The Unholy Trinity: Regulatory Forbearance, Stressed Banks and Zombie Firms. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28435.pdf（908KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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