| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28458 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28458 |
| Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance | |
| Christopher Blattman; Gustavo Duncan; Benjamin Lessing; Santiago Tobón | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | As in many cities, gangs in Medellín provide order and collect “taxes.” Why do gangs govern civilians? Some argue that criminal and state rule are substitutes. Hence, increasing state presence should crowd out gangs. But they could also be complements. States produce growth and general demand for governance. Also, gangs can deter state entry by keeping neighborhoods orderly. We exploit border discontinuities to show that increases in state presence raised gang rule. The data suggest that gangs reacted strategically, preserving order to keep the state out. Criminal groups govern millions, and our results help explain these patterns emerge and persist. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28458 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586132 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Blattman,Gustavo Duncan,Benjamin Lessing,et al. Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28458.pdf（1609KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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