| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28459 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28459 |
| Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets Mexican Data | |
| Harold L. Cole; Daniel Neuhann; Guillermo Ordoñez | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using a novel data set containing all bids by all bidders for Mexican government bonds from 2001 to 2017, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key determinant of primary market bond yields. Empirically, large bidders do not pay more for bonds than the average bidder but their bids are accepted more frequently. We construct a model where investors may differ in wealth, risk aversion, market power and information, and find that only heterogeneous information can qualitatively account for these patterns. Moreover, asymmetric information about rare disasters can quantitatively match key moments of bids and yields, both within and across periods. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28459 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586133 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harold L. Cole,Daniel Neuhann,Guillermo Ordoñez. Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets Mexican Data. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28459.pdf（559KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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