| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w28487
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28487
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| Kinks as Goals: Accelerating Commissions and the Performance of Sales Teams |
| Peter J. Kuhn; Lizi Yu
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| 发表日期 | 2021-02-22
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study the performance of small retail sales teams facing an incentive scheme that includes both a lump sum bonus and multiple accelerators (kinks where the piece rate jumps upward). Consistent with standard labor supply models, we find that the presence of an attainable bonus or kink on a work-day raises mean sales, and that sales are highly bunched at the bonus. Inconsistent with those models, we find that teams bunch at the kinks instead of avoiding them. Teams’ responses to the kinks are consistent with models in which the kinks are perceived as symbolic rewards, or where kinks induce a sufficient amount of loss aversion. Since bunching at both the target and kinks is strongest in larger, more experienced teams, we argue that these reference points are best understood as shared goals, used by teams to motivate and co-ordinate their members. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
; Other
; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28487
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586159
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Peter J. Kuhn,Lizi Yu. Kinks as Goals: Accelerating Commissions and the Performance of Sales Teams. 2021.
|
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文件名：
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w28487.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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