| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28489 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28489 |
| The Two Faces of Information | |
| Gaetano Gaballo; Guillermo Ordoñez | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In absence of insurance contracts to share risk, public information is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it empowers self-insurance as agents better react to shocks, reducing risk. On the other hand, it weakens market-insurance as common knowledge of shocks restricts trading risk. We embody these two faces of information in a single general-equilibrium model. We characterize the conditions under which market-insurance is superior, and then public information – even though costless and precise – is socially undesirable. In the absence of information, however, market-insurance is still underprovided as individuals fail to internalize its general equilibrium benefits. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28489 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586161 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gaetano Gaballo,Guillermo Ordoñez. The Two Faces of Information. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28489.pdf（848KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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