| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28491 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28491 |
| Contractual Rigidity and Political Contestability: Revisiting Public Contract Renegotiations | |
| Jean Beuve; Marian W. Moszoro; Pablo T. Spiller | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of public procurement in which both contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation while political tolerance for deviations decreases with political competition. We then compare renegotiation rates of procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find robust evidence consistent with the model predictions: public-to-private contracts are renegotiated more often than comparable private-to-private contracts, and that this pattern is more salient in politically contestable jurisdictions. The frequent renegotiation of public contracts results from their inherent rigidity and provides a relational quality of adaptability to contingencies in politically contestable environments. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28491 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586163 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Beuve,Marian W. Moszoro,Pablo T. Spiller. Contractual Rigidity and Political Contestability: Revisiting Public Contract Renegotiations. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28491.pdf（3918KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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