全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w28501
来源ID	Working Paper 28501
	Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System
	Juliane Begenau; Tim Landvoigt
发表日期	2021-03-01
出版年	2021
语种	英语
摘要	How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulation. Tighter capital requirements for regulated banks cause higher convenience yield on debt of all banks, leading to higher shadow bank leverage and a larger shadow banking sector. At the same time, tighter regulation eliminates the subsidies to commercial banks from deposit insurance, reducing the competitive pressures on shadow banks to take risks. The net effect is a safer financial system with more shadow banking. Calibrating the model to data on financial institutions in the U.S., the optimal capital requirement is around 16%.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w28501
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586173
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Juliane Begenau,Tim Landvoigt. Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System. 2021.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w28501.pdf（574KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览