| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28512 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28512 |
| School Assignment by Match Quality | |
| Atila Abdulkadiroglu; Umut M. Dur; Aram Grigoryan | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Proponents of school choice argue that it improves educational outcomes by allowing parents to self-select into schools that are most effective for their children. Contrary to these arguments, empirical evidence suggests that parents may not incorporate school effectiveness or match quality when choosing schools. The findings potentially impugn proponents' effectiveness arguments of choice-based assignment. We develop novel solutions that restore effectiveness by maximizing match quality subject to stability constraints. Maximization algorithms are provided for both small and large school districts. Simulations reveal substantial match quality gains from our solutions compared to the celebrated Deferred Acceptance mechanism with a random tie-breaker. Our methodology can be used to optimize for other policy objectives in school choice or other priority-based matching problems. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28512 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586184 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Atila Abdulkadiroglu,Umut M. Dur,Aram Grigoryan. School Assignment by Match Quality. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28512.pdf（747KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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