| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28518 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28518 |
| Limited-Tenure Concessions for Collective Goods | |
| Nicolas Quérou; Agnes Tomini; Christopher Costello | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze theoretically an institution called a “limited-tenure concession” for its ability to induce efficient public goods contribution and common-pool resource extraction. The basic idea is that by limiting the tenure over which an agent can enjoy the public good, but offering the possibility of renewal contingent on ample private provision of that good, efficient provision may be induced. We first show in a simple repeated game setting that limited-tenure concessions can incentivize socially-efficient provision of public goods. We then analyze the ability of this instrument to incentivize the first best provision for common-pool natural resources such as fish and water, thus accounting for spatial connectivity and natural growth dynamics of the resource. The duration of tenure and the dispersal of the resource play pivotal roles in whether this limited-duration concession induces the socially optimal private provision. Finally, in a setting with costly monitoring, we discuss the features of a concession contract that ensure first-best behavior, but at least cost to the implementing agency. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28518 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586190 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Quérou,Agnes Tomini,Christopher Costello. Limited-Tenure Concessions for Collective Goods. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28518.pdf（515KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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