| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28530 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28530 |
| Equilibrium in the Market for Public School Teachers: District Wage Strategies and Teacher Comparative Advantage | |
| Barbara Biasi; Chao Fu; John Stromme | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the equity-efficiency implication of giving school districts control over teacher pay using an equilibrium model of the market for public-school teachers. Teachers differ in their comparative advantages in teaching low- or high-achieving students. School districts, which serve different student bodies, use both wage and hiring strategies to compete for their preferred teachers. We estimate the model using data from Wisconsin, where districts gained control over teacher pay in 2011. We find that, all else equal, giving districts control over teacher pay would lead to more efficient teacher-district sorting but larger educational inequality. Teacher bonus programs that incentivize comparative advantage-based sorting, combined with bonus rates favoring districts with more low-achieving students, could improve both efficiency and equity. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Labor Relations ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28530 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Barbara Biasi,Chao Fu,John Stromme. Equilibrium in the Market for Public School Teachers: District Wage Strategies and Teacher Comparative Advantage. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28530.pdf（511KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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